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The US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: Geopolitics, Postcoloniality,  
and the Challenge of Rising Identities  
 
Abstract 
The US rebalance to the Asia Pacific is consistently interpreted as a response to China’s material 
rise. While not entirely incorrect, this assumption—derived from an overriding faith in the 
explanatory significance of relative state capabilities—fails to explain why rapidly rising others, 
most notably India, remain absent from regional US security discourse, and why a heavy US 
presence in Asia predates China’s ascent of the 1970s onwards. To address these problems and 
offer an improved explanation of what the rebalance is, how and why it has come about, and 
what it is designed to achieve within the context of China’s rise, this analysis draws from critical 
geopolitics and postcolonial theory. It argues that the rebalance is best conceived as the 
(re)articulation of historical discourses which construct certain foreign Others like China as 
challenges to the ontological American self, making the rebalance an attempt to pacify a 
particular rising identity as much as a rising state actor. The analysis is motivated in part by the 
question of how the rebalance is enabled in its current form. From here, the article addresses an 
increasing yet regressive tendency of International Relations theory to deny studies of the ‘how 
possible’ explanatory value, encouraging their marginalization in favor of examinations into ‘why’ 
political decisions are made.  
 
Introduction: Debating the rebalance   
Announced in 2011, the US rebalance (formerly the ‘pivot’) to the Asia Pacific is multi-faceted, 
with political, economic, and security dimensions. Its stated purpose is to redirect resources and 
attention to a region considered increasingly vital to American interests, by intensifying US 
involvement in organizations and institutions such as the Association of South East Asian 
Nations and the East Asia Summit; deepening US economic influence in the region through 
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such arrangements as the Trans-Pacific Partnership; and reasserting and strengthening security 
agreements with Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and others. The rebalance is a significant 
element of long-term US foreign policy, and ‘an effort to preserve “hegemony light” in the face 
of an unprecedented shift in global power from West to East’.1  
While the rebalance is complex and wide-ranging, the effects of China’s rapid ascent 
since the late 1970s are such that it, more than any other single actor, lies at the heart of 
Washington’s decision to ‘pivot’ to Asia. In the relevant International Relations (IR) literature 
this is where the focus typically falls and the rebalance is consistently interpreted primarily as a 
response to China’s rise. Analyses are also commonly framed by realist-informed conceptions of 
power as the (economic and military) attributes of states; as a new competitor rises, the logic 
goes, the dominant power responds by defending its position.2 For example, Logan asserts that 
“the main factor driving Washington’s interest in the region is the growing economic and 
military power of the People’s Republic of China”.3 “There is no doubt that the pivot was 
motivated by concerns over China’s growing power, influence, and behavior in the Asia-
Pacific”,4 argues Swaine. For Satake and Ishihara, “there is no question that the rise of China is 
the largest part of the Obama Administration’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”.5 While in certain 
respects valid and useful, and while the importance of China’s expanding physical presence 
cannot be dismissed, such faith in the explanatory significance of shifts in relative state capability 
is problematic and limiting.  
A key problem is that Americans and their policymakers do not fear the rise of every 
large nation relative to the United States or respond in identical ways. Alongside China for 
example, India is recognized to be generating “a major shift in regional security dynamics”.6 Yet, 
the notion of an ‘India threat’ is essentially non-existent in US security discourse. This absence, 
moreover, goes largely unquestioned throughout the literature. China’s economic and military 
assets are by most measures greater than India’s. However, in 1995 China’s economy was third 
largest in the world, accounting for around six percent of global GDP7 and its rise was already 
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generating concern in the United States. Today, India’s economy is third largest in the world and 
also accounts for six percent of global GDP. It is nuclear-armed (and, unlike China, a non-
signatory to the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and boasts more 
aircraft carriers than China. Yet, its rise is met with comparative calm. Furthermore, since the US 
economy now accounts for a smaller proportion of world GDP than in 1995 (23 percent then 
compared to 19 percent now)8, India’s capabilities ostensibly make it a more significant 
competitor now than was ‘threatening’ China of the mid-1990s.  
A second problem is that to justify analysis of the rebalance as a response to China’s rise, 
its origins must be traced to concerns over China’s material growth. However, the United States 
has sustained a heavy presence throughout the Asia Pacific since long before the beginnings of 
China’s rise, in the absence of the factors now cited as responsible for the policy. It could be 
argued that its ‘original’ rebalance to Asia was in response to a material competitor of the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the Soviet Union. Yet independent from its physicalities the communist 
Soviet Union (and indeed China, which posed some level of danger to American security from 
the early 1950s but which for decades represented the so-called ‘sick man of Asia’) was 
powerfully conceived as threatening to the United States’ democratic, anti-communist identity.9 
In any case, the disappearance of the Soviet ‘threat’ in 1989 did not prompt a mass US 
withdrawal from Asia. Together, these problems suggest that the forces which drive and 
underpin the rebalance are more complex and less analytically convenient than asserted 
elsewhere.    
The first aim of this article is to resolve these interconnected problems, to enable a more 
satisfactory understanding of what the rebalance is, how and why it has come about, and what it 
is designed to achieve, particularly within the context of China’s much-debated rise. From a 
framework built around critical geopolitics and postcolonial theory, it is argued that, rather than 
merely a reaction to shifting patterns of material power in a self-evident Asia Pacific (from West 
to East or from the US to China), the rebalance is more meaningfully recognized as the 
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(re)articulation of geopolitical discourses which have always constructed the reality of an Asia 
Pacific and its constituent actors. The importance of China’s contemporary rise cannot be 
dismissed, but it is shown that these discourses ensure the United States has always been 
especially prone to assessing its security in ontological terms, so that historical determinations of 
threat have arisen not simply from calculations of relative state power, but from interpretations 
of the extent to which certain foreign Others have challenged the meaning and purpose of the 
American self. Ultimately, this makes today’s rebalance less a response to China’s rise than to 
China’s rise, designed to contain and pacify a particular rising identity as much as a rising state 
actor.  
In light of this first aim the analysis is directed in part by ‘how possible’ rather than 
traditional ‘why’, questions. Why questions seek to explain why decisions and policies are made 
within social realities which are assumed and given.10 The existing IR literature on the rebalance 
is guided largely by this form of enquiry; the apparent objectivities of the United States, like 
those of all international actors, are taken for granted and the US is said to be responding to 
(among other things) the challenges a newly powerful China brings. While this mode of analysis 
is not without value, it has left unresolved the problems outlined above. How questions 
problematize ‘objective’ realities to expose forms of power why questions overlook. Their focus 
is the constitutive function of discursive as well as material power, and the claims to knowledge 
and truth attached to both the world and its subjectivities. As a result, they are better equipped to 
explain how political practices which appear problematic or even contradictory through the lens 
of ‘why’ frameworks, such as those of the rebalance aimed at centralizing and disciplining rising 
China while embracing rising India can appear logical and even necessary, while potential 
alternatives such as those which might acknowledge dangers in the rise of others like India or 
even precipitate a gradual withdrawal from the Asia Pacific can be readily dismissed.11  
With such analyses proliferating within IR however, the secondary aim of this article is to 
contribute to these theoretical debates by addressing an unhelpful tendency to conceptually 
6 
 
dislocate ‘how’ from ‘why’ questions. While proponents of each may hold ontologically 
irreconcilable views on the social construction of reality, informing on how policies are enabled 
in a linguistically-manufactured world is not a complete barrier to enhancing our understanding 
of why decisions behind those policies are made. Denying this link has disciplinary 
consequences, by perpetuating a misleading conviction that the more ‘critical’ approaches to the 
field terminally lack explanatory value. Demonstrating that the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific is 
steered by the perceived need to meet the challenge of a rising Other informs on the availability 
of political practice (‘how’), but also in certain important respects on motivations and purpose 
(‘why’).   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a critically-driven genealogy of 
the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific by tracing its discursive logic through American history, 
development, and identity beyond today’s rise of China to enduring rituals of the American self. 
The third section examines the contemporary manifestation of these rituals through a systematic 
discourse analysis of government statements on the rebalance between 2011 and 2015, in the 
pursuit of a more satisfactory empirical understanding of the policy as well as an improved 
theoretical appreciation of the explanatory contributions of the type of ‘how possible’ framework 
it adopts. The paper concludes by calling for a broader paradigm shift, from the study of rising 
powers to that of rising identities and the dynamics they share with dominant international 
actors. While increasingly crowded, this area of study has been comparatively slow to 
accommodate such forces as identity, discourse, and spacialization which the wider discipline has 
steadily adopted into its mainstream.           
 
A genealogy of the rebalance: Geopolitics, postcolonialism, and the politics of identity   
Logan, Swaine, Ross and others examine the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific in an 
unproblematic world in which the United States is responding to a self-evidently rising China. 
Yet these actors are not self-evident or unproblematic. Their realities (as threatening, benevolent, 
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cooperative and so on) are subjectively defined, and socially and imaginatively constructed. Like 
the world they inhabit they are discursively spacialized or geo-graphed.12 The Asia Pacific for 
example was imagined into existence as recently as the 1970s, through the agglomeration of East 
and South East Asia.13 Peoples and places, moreover, are Othered from understandings of the 
self and for the self, with China historically existing in uncivilized, idealized, and anachronistic 
forms, among others, from the vantage point of the necessarily more ‘civilized’, ‘Enlightened’, 
‘technological’ United States.14 This makes the relationship between self and Other inherently co-
constitutive; “identity is constituted in relation to difference and [d]ifference is constituted in 
relation to identity”.15  
The United States’ contemporary geographical claims to the Asia Pacific, then, like all 
claims, are geopolitical because they inscribe Others with meanings which determine how they 
should be dealt.16 Discourse is thus not simply descriptive but performative in that it produces 
the effects that it names,17 fabricating global territories as sites of interest and material power. 
“Although often assumed to be innocent…geography [is]…a product of histories of struggle 
between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and administer space”.18  
In asking ‘how’ the rebalance is being enabled in its current form, the claim here is not 
that direct causal lines can be convincingly drawn between selected discourses and the 
implementation of policy. As Doty observes, the explanations of why questions are incomplete 
because they tend to take for granted the possibility that particular courses of action can happen, 
by presupposing the backgrounds of discursive meaning so central to that process. Asking ‘how’ 
is thus to examine how certain meanings are produced and attached to social subjects, creating 
discursive environments within which practices are made possible and others are precluded.19  
The aim here then is to expose the discursive conditions which make ostensibly problematic or 
contradictory policies around the rebalance possible and which, as noted above, more traditional 
paradigms have difficulty explaining, through an analysis of the political history of the 
production of truth and knowledge about the ‘realities’ of China, the United States, India, and so 
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on. It is to undermine the problematic self-evidences of the existing literature by revealing how 
rituals of power arise, take shape, gain importance, and affect contemporary politics.20 In tracing 
the genealogy of the rebalance, then, the expectation is not to locate its physical ‘origin’ in the 
rise of China, the Cold War or elsewhere. It is to explore the constitution of its knowledges 
through a ‘history of the present in terms of its past’, to show how ‘the present has become 
logically possible’.21  
Throughout US history, American expansionism has been less a policy than a mode of 
being. Nation states have consistently exhibited expansionist tendencies, particularly those with 
the most land and resources. However, brought into existence not by a people of common race 
or religion but by disparate groups from all over the world, the US has arguably to a unique 
extent always been forced to bind itself according to a set of defining ideals and values, such as 
democracy, freedom, and liberty and, crucially, by the knowledge that these values are universal.22 
“Only in a country where it is so unclear what is American do people worry so much about the 
threat of things ‘un-American’.”23 Thus, the United States was born a ‘redeemer nation’, with an 
inherent duty to export its identity for the global good.24 It could also be argued that this remains 
an especially powerful and persuasive myth within the United States because, unlike the imperial 
powers of Europe in particular, the US quickly gained its own North American empire and never 
lost it. From the base of 13 originally colonies on the eastern seaboard, Thomas Jefferson’s 
‘Empire of Liberty’ was expected to civilize the continent: “[w]here this progress will stop no-
one can say. Barbarism …will in time, I trust, disappear from the Earth”.25  
The barbarism Jefferson had first in mind was of course that of Native Americans, and 
in its conflicts with them the US worked to secure and inflate both its physical and ontological 
boundaries. Assessments of national security, indeed, are heavily imbued with considerations of 
identity. “Ontological security is security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of 
who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice”.26 Ontological difference primes an 
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identity to the possibility of aggression,27 and with the American self defined by powerful ideas 
and values it has always correspondingly maintained highly value-driven conceptions of security.  
The desire to expand and seize resources was certainly a motivating drive, but the US 
does not invade every country over which it boasts superiority. Foreign Others are constructed 
in such ways as to make the application of American power contingent upon understandings of 
who to invade and who not.28 While it could have captured (and still could capture) some or all 
of Canada for example, this was precluded by discursive regulations of mainstream debate.29 
Discursive mechanisms can establish ‘truths’ which dictate the boundaries of political possibility 
by making it all-but impossible to think beyond them.30 Holland argues that discourses achieve 
such a controlling effect over foreign policy by becoming conceivable, resonant, and dominant 
and nullifying oppositional voices.31 Discourses, indeed, can become naturalized statements of 
fact,32 or common sense, a form of knowledge which goes unchallenged from the assumption 
that it reflects reality.33  
Native Americans were no credible threat to US survival, but by their existence as Native 
Americans and the largely uncontested ideas by which they were defined, they challenged the 
core tenets of its identity. Moreover, they were not passive constructions of an Enlightened 
American self. The two were co-constitutive, with the ‘uncivilized’ former active in the 
(re)affirmation of the more ‘civilized’ latter as it advanced across the continent. Explains 
Trachtenberg: “In this ‘progress’, this proof of ‘America’, the profoundest role was reserved not 
for the abundance of land but for the fatal presence of the Indian…‘Civilization’ required a 
‘savagery’ against which to distinguish itself”.34 
US expeditions beyond its western coastal borders were a “logical outcome of the 
nation’s march to the Pacific”,35 with understandings of potential material gain still functions of a 
unique interpretive lens. For instance, in 1842 Britain forced China to lift restrictions on foreign 
trade and Beijing reluctantly signed an ‘unequal treaty’. Two years later, and despite US being 
founded upon the rhetoric of self-determination and anti-imperialism, Washington secured an 
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identical agreement. Thus while nineteenth century China represented an economic opportunity 
for the United States, that ‘opportunity’ existed in the imagination of the American self, for the 
American self.36 Japan was similarly opened up in 1854, and when the US occupied the 
Philippines from around the turn of the twentieth century Americans’ experiences with Native 
Americans and Mexicans provided the operational framework for civilization to be brought to 
the ‘uncivilized’ Filipinos.37  
While peoples and places are Othered according to understandings about the self 
however, identity cannot be essentialized to the point where it identifiably ‘exists’, as positivists 
and some constructivists suggest.38 The fluidity of discourse has thus allowed the US to redefine 
itself over time as (combinations of) ‘White’, ‘Enlightened’, ‘anti-communist’ etc. The 
significance of Others as ‘non-White’, ‘exotic’ ‘communist’ etc., have correspondingly evolved.39 
During the early Cold War when the US first embedded itself in East Asia, the Others to which 
it responded challenged the American self in different ways than before. As already noted 
however, the ‘threats’ were equally manufactured.  
US officials considered a Soviet attack unlikely and, in any case, the danger it posed was 
not considered primarily of the military. The Soviet Union was not a threatening actor which 
happened to be communist. In large part it was threatening because it was communist, and a 
challenge to America’s self-proclaimed status as leader of the ‘free world’. Communism 
endangered the very being of America, with its apparent threat to US private ownership code for 
distinguishing ‘civilized’ from ‘savage’.40 In 1949 the National Security Council argued that China 
was unable to threaten the US for a ‘generation or more’.41 Following its communist revolution 
later that year however ‘Red China’ joined the Soviet Union as an imminent danger. 
Simultaneously, Taiwan became a recipient of American protection. A member of the ‘free 
world’, Taiwan was anti-democratic and authoritarian until martial law was lifted in 1987. Yet 
because Taiwan, like China, is unknowable outside of the discourses which sustain it, this was 
largely irrelevant. How the United States could logically invest in the security of an anti-
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democratic island of which few Americans had heard is explained only by its status as an 
imaginative geography attributed meaning by the anti-communist American self.42  
The triumph of communism in 1970s Vietnam inflicted no significant adverse effects on 
US security. Yet, Washington spent $170 billion dollars43 and almost 50,000 American lives trying 
to defeat it.44 With no strategic or economic value to the conflict there America’s involvement 
makes little sense without recourse to the role of representational power which molded the 
‘reality’ that such costs were necessary. Rituals of discursive power arose, took shape, gained 
importance and affected contemporary politics from the ‘truth’ that Vietnam, “the frontier of 
freedom”,45 was a critical site of American power.  
At this point it is worth noting that centralizing discourse to foreign policy analysis is not 
to deny the existence of an external world, reduce reality to the domain of language or dismiss 
the importance of material properties. It is to say that the material world exists within, and as a 
function of, discourse, since this is our primary means of making sense of it. The meanings we 
draw from actors are filtered through lenses colored by the biases, expectations and experiences 
identities bring. Contemporary China is more physically able than before to exert harm. However 
the China ‘threat’ to US security is traced as clearly to the fears and sensitivities of American 
identity as to Beijing’s physical attributes. The US rebalance to the Asia Pacific, like the world 
around it, does not exist outside of discourse but is constituted by it.  
Rituals of discursive power still operate today, as evidenced by tracing the rebalance not to 
the beginnings of a realpolitik saga when the US physically established itself across the region, 
but through the constitution of knowledges of foreign Others and the ontological security-
seeking practices of the American self. At the center of these practices remain the (subjectively-
defined) values of democracy, freedom and liberty, and their securitization for national survival. 
To demonstrate these assertions, this conceptual framework provides escape from the kinds of 
problems highlighted in the introduction which emanate from a traditional faith in the 
explanatory value of shifts in material power in a seemingly self-evident world. It presents the 
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opportunity instead to explore the geopolitical claims to power which continue to frame and 
regulate the potentialities of policy. As Ó Tuathail explains, the act of geo-graphing defined the 
colonial period, but “the struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the 
one hand, and rebellious margins and dissident cultures, on the other hand, is still with us”.46 The 
contemporary discursive logic of these claims to power is now examined through a systemic 
analysis of US government statements on the rebalance, to address the key silences of the 
literature identified at the outset.  
 
Revisiting the rebalance  
Research design 
In her analysis of 1950s American military intervention in the Philippines, Doty examines not 
why the US intervened, but how powerful textual mechanisms created a world in which it could 
act against its self-defined status as a promoter of sovereignty and postcolonial equality. 
Counterinsurgency was enabled from the ‘truth’ that ‘vulnerable’ and ‘uninformed’ Filipinos 
required the help of the ‘moral’ and ‘benevolent’ United States. The techniques of predication, 
presupposition and subject positioning made Washington’s activities appear logical, necessary 
and in line with the values of American identity.47 
 Predicates are descriptive characteristics such as ‘weak’, ‘ideological’, ‘engages in noble 
causes’ etc. Underlying clusters of predicates are broader presuppositions in the form of binary 
oppositions, such as ‘good/evil’, which provide a convenient method of distinguishing self from 
Other. Subject positioning orders subjects hierarchically, enabling ‘stronger’, ‘morally superior’ 
actors to engage in practices made uncontroversial by the ‘weakness’ or ‘disruptiveness’ of 
others.48 This was in part how America’s self-harming war in Vietnam was made possible for 
example, as “once again [Americans] embarked upon a heroic…conquest of an inferior race”.49     
As already established, the existing literature on the US rebalance to Asia is bound by a 
common understanding of the ‘why’: the United States is rebalancing to Asia (at least in part) 
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because of the physical rise of China and the challenges its capabilities bring. Yet Americans do 
not fear the rise of every significant state actor or respond in identical ways, and the US presence 
across the region predates China’s meteoritic growth. An understanding of the ‘how possible’ 
addresses these problems, from an analysis of how the discursive and representational processes 
(or rituals) of the American self examined so far enable policies for which the more traditional 
paradigms have difficulty accounting. In doing so, the discursive logic of today’s rebalance can 
be traced beyond the contemporary rise of China through American history, development, and 
identity.  
To conduct this analysis, the 15 fullest government articulations of the rebalance, 
between October 2011 when the policy was announced and April 2015, were collected. These 
can be seen in Table 1 below. The statements were authored by the Department of State (six), 
the White House (five), and the Department of Defense (four). Two were released in 2011; two 
in 2012; seven in 2013; three in 2014; and one in 2015. This sample represents the three key 
dimensions of the rebalance (military, economic and diplomatic) described in the introduction, 
and reflects a relative proliferation of governmental rhetoric on the policy throughout 2013.50  
 
Table 1: Key government statements on the rebalance, October 2011-April 2015 
<Table 1 here> 
 
Government statements on the rebalance are highly choreographed and it could be argued that 
they artificially simplify the complex landscape of international affairs merely to legitimize policy 
to the wider public. This is a valid concern. However, a lack of discursive sophistication should 
not be interpreted as a sign of detachment from the ‘real’ world of policy formulation and 
enactment. The United States’ recent War on Terrorism operated according to imaginary 
divisions between good and evil, ‘us’ and ‘them’, which became so powerful and compelling 
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precisely because of their binary and accessible nature.51 As we have seen here, since the 
beginnings of US history constructions of self and Other (civilized vs uncivilized, democracy vs 
non-democracy etc.) have rationalized acts of American internationalism by bringing an 
uncomplicated framework for action to an inconveniently complicated world.  
Government statements on the rebalance are also not considered here to present 
definitive constructions of either the US self or foreign Others since understandings of identities 
are always subjectively contested. They are also likely to obscure the varying and even ‘real’ 
opinions of those (possibly numerous, unnamed) individuals who contribute to them. 
Nonetheless, and as will be shown, they reveal patterns of geopolitical discourse which extend 
across key departments of Washington’s foreign policy machinery, framing understandings of 
‘what’ China, India, the United States, and so on represent. These patterns are then not only seen 
to be active in enabling the rebalance to Asia in its current form, but consistent with some of the 
most powerful discourses, texts, and worldviews so central to American internationalism of the 
past. Competing claims to ‘truth’ are not unimportant. However certain discourses become 
central to the policy process while others are correspondingly marginalized, and the value of the 
documents utilized here should not be considered in isolation from the long history of the 
present about which this analysis is so concerned.  
From the statements utilized for this analysis, a list of recurring predicates attributed to 
the United States, China, India, and the Asia Pacific was generated. As each predicate emerged it 
was assigned a code to systematize its quantification (e.g. US as a ‘Promoter of Asia Pacific 
peace/security’ = US5, China as a ‘Challenge/presents challenges’ = C2, etc.). To present a 
meaningful and manageable dataset, codes which appeared in three or fewer of the 15 statements 
were discarded. Table 2 shows the final list of predicates, their frequencies, and the statements in 
which they appear:  
 
Table 2: Subjects and their predicates in US government statements on the rebalance, 2011-2015  
15 
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
The geopolitics of the rebalance: A history of the present  
As seen in Table 2, governmental discourse of the rebalance consistently (in each of the 15 
statements) constructs the US as a promoter of peace and security. As with all identified 
predicates this has the potential to overlap with and implicate others, in this case on occasion 
with the ‘truth’ that an American security presence benefits regional prosperity (which alone is 
advanced in 13 of the 15 statements). Argues Clinton: American treaty alliances in Asia “have 
underwritten regional peace and security…shaping the environment for the region’s remarkable 
economic ascent”.52 It works too in conjunction with the US as competent, with strong 
leadership qualities, demonstrated by its possession of “cutting-edge capabilities”53 or its 
commitment to not “shy away from…defending our interests, our allies, and our partners 
throughout the region”.54 The intention is not to question the validity of these assertions; in 
many respects the US has facilitated regional security and prosperity. Rather, it is to show that 
these ‘truths’ are not of objective reality. They are products of, and contributors to, discursively 
manipulated realities which operate in the service of the United States and its practices in the 
region, especially within the context of a rising China.   
For instance, Clinton asserts that, “[b]y virtue of our unique geography, the United States 
is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power”.55 Yet there is nothing unique about US geography in 
this regard, since Canada, Mexico, Colombia and others also border both oceans. US geography 
remains political geography and inextricable from the exertion of power as its unspectacular 
physical contours (in this sense at least) are bestowed exceptional qualities which reinforce 
established notions of America’s internationalist duties. Essentially unquestioned, Clinton’s 
fantasized reality is apparent common sense and unproblematic. So is the ‘fact’ that US duties, 
necessitated by its ‘universal’ values, legitimately extend to wherever it chooses. Statements on 
the rebalance purposefully present the US as a ‘Pacific Power’ (or ‘nation’), but this is not merely 
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descriptive. It is an inherently performative call to action, turning foreign problems into domestic 
problems by helping to ensure that the United States acts in distant Asia as naturally as Vietnam, 
the Philippines, and, most importantly, China.  
This shows that the subject positioning between the US and China (or any other) is not 
performed only or even primarily at the level of relative capabilities. Scholars are right to identify 
the rise of China as a key motivating force behind American regional policy. But the imaginative 
geography of rising China means something to the American self which, notably, rising India 
(the next most frequently appearing actor in the statements) does not, and vice versa. Each 
relationship is defined by powerful presuppositions. US officials (in nine out of 15 statements) 
stress that Washington is committed to working with China, and (in four out of 15) that China’s 
rise is welcomed. As Secretary of Defense Ash Carter states, “I reject the zero-sum thinking that 
China’s gain is our loss”.56 Indeed, while punctuated by sites of tension contemporary US-China 
relations are broadly productive and cooperative. Yet just as Native Americans were both a 
prominent construct of European-American identity and essential to its affirmation, the Chinese 
Other does much to necessitate the presence of the fantasized American self in Asia.  
Statements on the rebalance do not hide this contemporized geo-graphing of the region 
and its actors. Indeed, they are continually set within the context of “differences” between the 
US and China. “[W]e have some fundamental differences that cannot be minimized”, observes 
National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice.57 Secretary of State John Kerry notes that US China 
policy is built on coordinating interests and managing differences, about which Washington is 
“clear-eyed”.58 While these differences are rarely spelt out, to the democratic United States 
China’s communist structures imbue its modern day rise with ominous connotations.59 
Ontological difference still primes the US to the possibility of aggression60 but, to return to an 
earlier point, identities cannot be essentialized as definitively knowable, as the case of ‘free’ yet 
authoritarian Cold War Taiwan demonstrates. What matters is not so much Chinese communism 
as the understanding that Chinese communism challenges the anti-communist American self.61      
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To view India as a strategic counterbalance to a more materially powerful China would 
again not necessarily be incorrect, but incomplete nonetheless. A third of statements emphasize 
India’s democratic credentials which, in an identical but contrary manner to China, enables 
American identity and invigorates the US in the Asia Pacific. As Clinton explains, India 
complements rather than contradicts American values: “the Obama administration has expanded 
our bilateral partnership…and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and 
politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin”.62 Kerry remarks: “the United 
States and China…have different political systems, different histories, different cultures, 
and…different views on certain significant issues”.63 By most measures each of these also applies 
to the US and India. Yet here the focus is on closer ties “rooted in common values and 
interests”.64 India’s rise is not simply less dramatic and quantitatively different to China’s; in 
American imaginations it is qualitatively so.  
Naturalized discourses of the United States and its place in the world ensure that US 
power remains contingent upon understandings of who to invade, contain and pacify and who 
not. Support for India’s growth is essentially unconditional, with assessments of its rise rarely 
qualified. “[T]he United States and the world benefit from a stable and prosperous China”, Kerry 
argues, but only a China “that assumes the responsibilities of a great power…respects the will of 
its people [and]…plays by the rules”.65 The insistence that China plays by international rules 
appears in six statements, and in 12 statements those rules, and the fairness they promote, are 
identified as protectorates of the United States.  
Satake and Ishirara argue that articulations of the rebalance are framed by the need for 
transparency from Beijing, the challenges posed by China’s military, and the demand that it 
abides by international rules.66 Yet those rules are not simply ‘there’ to be followed. In a sense 
they do not even exist, at least in the form typically assumed. In six statements it is argued that 
China requires discipline or guidance over human rights, for example—another caveat tied to 
acceptance of its rise. Yet no state upholds human rights to their fullest and a quarter of the 
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Indian population is designated Scheduled Castes or Tribes.67 These “broken people” suffer 
abuse, discrimination and a form of apartheid unresolved by failed legislation.68 India also has the 
highest number of child laborers in the world.69  
Spacializing the world in this way encapsulates the continuing “struggle between 
centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the one hand, and rebellious margins and 
dissident cultures, on the other”70. When China is specifically singled out as a beneficiary of “the 
open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain”,71 the 
responsibility falls on Beijing alone to behave or risk disciplinary measures for appearing 
rebellious or, in modern parlance, ‘revisionist’. As such, the US is concerned that China abides by 
international rules, but those rules are imaginary constructs made significant or not, and judged 
to have been complied with or not, according to the mechanics of presupposition and subject 
positioning. Rather than from statutes of law, in large part they emerge from ontological 
differentiation.  
US engagement in the Asia Pacific, and by extension its internationalism, also continues 
to represent less a political choice than a mode of being. In a majority of statements it is argued 
that American values and/or principles, which Clinton asserts are the United States’ ‘most potent 
asset’ in the Asia Pacific, even above the military,72 should be exported for the greater good. Such 
an understanding remains a common sense statement of fact; the question is never whether the 
world benefits from ‘universal’ American values, only how best they are delivered. For political 
practice to be legitimized and for additional narratives to be rendered unthinkable, discourses 
dominate by nullifying opposition.73 Thus when Ash Carter explains that “[w]e must all decide if 
we are going to…cement our influence and leadership in the fastest-growing region in the world; 
or if, instead, we’re going to take ourselves out of the game”,74 he shuts down debate over 
American internationalism by removing all credibility from the only apparent alternative. 
Together with representations of the Asia Pacific as an opportunity for the United States in 12 of 
the 15 statements, little space is left for dissent.    
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Thus in several respects the rebalance represents modern day “proof of ‘America’”, by 
enhancing its presence in a region which has potential and is maturing (see Table 2) but which 
requires indispensable US support. Indeed, with a familiarly unquestioned duty to 
internationalism persists an enduring belief in the moral right to American power and hegemony. 
Three quarters of statements refer to the beneficial or benevolent role of the US military in the 
Asia Pacific. As tellingly, as constitutive of ideas about US power and purpose China’s military is 
envisioned as destabilizing in part for being morally illegitimate. This lack of legitimacy is once 
again a construct of discursive design.  
For example, Clinton observes that “[t]he United States and the international community 
have watched China’s efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as 
to its intentions”.75 In doing so she undermines China’s already uncertain relationship with the 
international community, but with no defined borders, membership, or qualifications for entry, 
that community is an imaginative geography par excellence. The American frontier once 
represented “the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization”.76 Now the talk is rarely about “civilization” versus “barbarism” or “savagery”, but 
that global binary of inside/outside is embodied in such fantasized institutions as the 
international community of which the US is its self-appointed figurehead. Civilization still 
requires a savagery against which to distinguish itself77 and the image of a China which lacks the 
full standards of civilization continues to pervade American politics.78 Rising India, by virtue of 
its ontologically-derived status as a “leader” of the American-led community,79 affirms the right 
of the US to its preeminent military position.  
This is how the present—the rebalance in its current form—becomes logically possible 
to the point where anything beyond procedural and strategic details escapes meaningful debate. 
Despite broadly cooperative relations, China exists as a strategic Other of the United States, “a 
discursive construct from which it cannot escape”.80 Even at a time of national budget cuts, the 
alternative of withdrawing or downsizing the United States’ 75,000-plus troops in myriad 
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regional bases and other facilities81 is conceived as no alternative at all. As Table 2 shows, then, 
in the broadest sense the ‘proof’ of America is found in the underlying presupposition that 
“different” China, constructed as a real or potential revisionist, rule-breaker, security threat and 
so on is a challenge which can only be met by an equally imagined United States as a leader and 
benevolent promotor of security and prosperity.  
China is neither a paragon of diplomacy or helpless victim of US aggression; its 
construction of new islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea for example is disruptive 
and unnecessarily provocative. Yet American performances of differentiation on which the 
rebalance relies are more than functions of China’s physical rise. Familiar rituals of the American 
self, which establish the ‘truth’ that China represents an ontological antagonist of the United 
States and its values predate, and are independent of, contemporary developments ‘out there’. 
Like Native Americans, Philippine insurgents, the Cold War Soviet Union, and others, modern 
day China by its very existence as China both challenges and reaffirms the American self in the 
Asia Pacific and its highly value-driven conceptions of security. 
 
Epilogue: On ‘how’ and ‘why’  
Doty’s distinction between ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, outlined in the introduction, emerged 
from claims that social science accommodates the separate pursuits of ‘explaining’ (why) and 
‘understanding’ (how). The first, associated with positivist/rationalist approaches to the field, is 
said ‘to explain the workings of nature’ through causal laws, ‘treating the human realm as part of 
nature’.82 The aim is to explain why decisions are made in a world ‘out there’ to see. The second, 
associated more with so-called post-positivist schools (including critical geopolitics and 
postcolonialism), is said to be designed to understand ‘what the events mean’.83 The aim is to 
deconstruct apparently unproblematic realities to show how the world is a function of language 
and discourse and how constitutive forms of power manufacture ‘truths’ which frame the limits 
of political potentiality.  
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Holland rightly observes that asking ‘how’ instead of ‘why’ offers a route to exploring the 
formation of ideas and subjectivities and their role in legitimizing policies while impeding the 
possibility of others.84 Equally however, an unhealthy and overtly regressive tendency has 
emerged for the contributions of how and why questions to be disentangled from one another, 
for interrogation on an either/or basis. Addressing this trend is important as explorations of the 
‘how possible’ increase in frequency, towards for example Britain’s colonial rule over Kenya;85 
European integration;86 and the United States’87 and Australia’s ‘Wars on Terror’.88 
As Alexander Wendt argued some time ago, “[t]here are always two stories to tell’ about 
international politics. Yet contained within the ‘Explanation and Understanding’ frame are the 
seeds of a more conflictual, zero-sum view”. Such a view inhibits the shared goal of making 
sense of global affairs. Moreover, distinguishing between “explainers” and “understanders” 
works primarily against the “understanders” by reinforcing the notion that while those forces 
may be interesting and novel, they hold no explanatory value.89 However, constitutive theories 
built around productive and discursive processes of power do provide explanations. These 
explanations may not be causal, “but they are explanations just the same”.90  
Certainly, authors stress that addressing the ‘how’ does not invalidate or overrule the 
‘why’. Yet with the former typically conceived as “complementary”91 at best, its dismissal in favor 
of the still-dominant latter is justified and even encouraged.92 At the level of ontology opinions 
over whether the world exists as objective ‘truth’ or as a product of discursive practice may be 
incompatible. But to suggest that answers to the question of how policy options are administered 
within socially constructed realities offer little or nothing to understandings of why those policies 
are implemented is to misrepresent and understate ‘critical’ or ‘interpretive’ paradigms.   
Powerful rituals of American identity reveal how the US can centralize and counter the 
‘challenges’ of rising China while the rise of India can be afforded unconditional freedom from 
suspicion, and how the notion of scaling back its regional presence and internationalism can be so 
unequivocally rejected. As such they speak to the regulation of political debate, but also to 
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motivations and purpose. The conclusions of the preceding analysis, in other words, are once 
again more explanatory than descriptive. The explanation is not causal since the genealogy 
presented here reveals the persistence of highly pervasive modes of representation and their 
intrusions into contemporary US foreign policy, rather than the creation de novo of specific 
patterns of behavior and a direct lineage to those of the present day. Nonetheless, it provides 
insight into why American power has always been applied in the ways that it has towards those 
that it has, and why alternative courses of action are rejected.  
When Doty observes that why questions take as unproblematic the possibility that US 
intervention in the Philippines could happen, she takes a conceptual step back to expose how its 
possibility emerged. Yet political possibility does not come about dispassionately, but from the 
worldviews which enable it. The performativity of discourse, and the mutually constitutive 
power/knowledge nexus which inscribes the world with geopolitical claims to power, make 
courses of action available but also desirable and even imperative—in Doty’s own words, 
“necessary”.93 In short, they act as prescriptive drivers for policy. The social construction of 
Filipinos as uncivilized and inferior helps us understand how political practice was enabled, but 
also inevitably why the decision was made for the ‘superior’ United States to intervene among 
‘uncivilized’, ‘inferior’ Filipinos who could not be trusted with their own future.  
Today, government statements on the rebalance help reveal both how the US is logically 
able to, among other things, discriminate between the physical growths and modernizations of 
socially constructed Others. More than this, the contours of its identity and the textual 
mechanisms by which those Others are understood to challenge or affirm the American self tell 
us why rising Others are ‘logically’ treated differently and why decisions behind the strategy are 
made. The US is now ‘rebalancing’ to the Asia Pacific in part because it is a ‘geographically 
unique’, ‘benevolent’ ‘Pacific power’ with an imagined right to hegemony in the area. China, 
meanwhile, specifically threatens peace and security from its place on the edge of the 
international community. These subjective rather than self-evident truths are motivating calls to 
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action. Demonstrating that the rebalance is designed to contain and pacify China’s rise as much 
as China’s rise thus unavoidably points to the mutual implication of the pursuits of both ‘how’ 
and ‘why’.  
Skeptical of the importance of post-positivist approaches, Stephen Walt argues that 
“issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-
indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world”.94 Yet rather than divorced from the 
world, discursive or productive forms of power are inextricable from it and central to the 
formulation of what we accept as ‘real’. Productive or discursive power should not be privileged 
since a “range of conceptualizations [of power] provides the basis for a better, richer, and fuller 
understanding of the workings of world politics”.95 This is the aim of scholars no matter their 
epistemological ‘camp’. Perpetuating a false dichotomy between ‘explainers’ and ‘understanders’, 
and the respective, contrasting contributions they are equipped to offer, can only be detrimental 
to the field.    
 
Conclusion: From rising powers to rising identities 
The US rebalance to the Asia Pacific is consistently presented as a response to the physical rise 
of China. While not incorrect, this explanation, which centralizes the importance of shifts in 
relative material power, fails to account for why Americans do not fear the relative rise of all 
states or why a heavy US presence in the region predates China’s rise. This analysis has shown 
that the rebalance is most meaningfully recognized not as an isolated strategy driven by 
contemporary assessments of a self-evident world, but as a (re)articulation of powerful 
geopolitical discourses which have long produced the reality of a world and the actors within it.  
Four years of government statements on the rebalance reveal that China presents 
distinctively qualitative, rather than simply quantitative, problems for the American self. A 
rapidly rising India reaffirms American identity and the validity of its regional security behaviors. 
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Like its colonization of North America and historical experiences with notable foreign Others, 
US engagement in the Asia Pacific is not a function of pure material interests. Material 
physicalities matter, but the rebalance emerges from often unquestioned discursive conditions 
which necessitate its design not for the containment or pacification of a ‘rising power’ per se, but 
of an ontologically significant rising identity. In examining Western interpretations of Asia 
Edward Said noted that the global East has “less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ 
world”.96 In many respects the same can be said of the US rebalance today. 
From this interrogation of how today’s rebalance appears logical and necessary, problems 
inherent to separating the question of ‘how’ political practices are enabled from those which 
examine ‘why’ decisions are made, can be exposed. Critical scholars are themselves guilty of 
reinforcing the misleading conviction that the former mode of analysis lacks explanatory value. 
Yet with the rebalance motivated not only by the perceived need to respond to new capabilities 
but to those of a particular Other whose existence challenges the security of the American self, 
interrogations of the ‘how possible’ are demonstrated to be more than just complementary to the 
‘why’. Advanced understandings of the constitution of knowledges and of the attribution of 
meanings further our understanding both of how political possibility is regulated and ‘why’ 
policies ultimately come about.   
In broader terms than is possible to explore here, this analysis also offers a useful 
platform from which to suggest that traditional theories of ‘rising power’-‘dominant power’ 
relations are limited and limiting. Framed by familiarly realist assumptions of power, these 
theories generally expect such relationships to become hostile and conflictual as the ‘capability 
gap’ narrows; as Nye asserts, “[r]apid power transitions are one of the leading causes of great 
power conflict”.97 John Mearsheimer argues that “power is the currency of international politics. 
Great powers…pay careful attention to how much economic and military power they have 
relative to each other”.98 Yet just like currency, the value of material power is not determined by 
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nature. It is imaginary, even illusionary, and attributed or denied importance through social 
interaction.  
In the case of at least one of Mearsheimer’s ‘great powers’, careful attention is paid not 
just to economic and military power but to the discursively composed subjectivities of itself and 
Others. For this reason, in an era when the rise of new ‘powers’ and supposed US decline are 
attracting ever more attention, it should be considered that a move from ‘rising powers’ towards 
‘rising identities’/‘rising Others’ might be productive. As above, this would not be to dismiss the 
importance of shifts in relative material capability. It would, however, create space for the forms 
of power which permeate and define material capability, shaping the realities of their shifts.   
History is littered with ‘power transitions’ which did not result in conflict, and 
contemporary dynamics between the United States and rising Others are further challenging 
traditional expectations. With such ideational forces as discourse, identity, and representation 
increasingly accommodated within mainstream analyses of world affairs, it seems curious that 
they remain comparatively marginalized by theoretical debates over so-called rising powers. 
Addressing this problem would be a first step towards the “fuller understanding” of 
contemporary global issues called for elsewhere.99 As this analysis indicates, this is best achieved 
by working to attenuate rather than promote intra-disciplinary conflict.    
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Table 1: Key government statements on the rebalance, October 2011-April 2015 
Date Department (Author) Statement number/title 
11-Oct-11 State (Hillary Clinton) (1) ‘America's Pacific Century’ 
17-Nov-11 W. House (Barack Obama) (2) ‘Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament’ 
02-Jun-12 Defense (Leon Panetta) (3) ‘The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific: Leon Panetta ‘ 
01-Aug-12 Defense (Ash Carter) (4) ‘Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech’ 
26-Jun-13 State (Joseph Yun) (5) ‘The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1)’ 
13-Mar-11 W. House (Tom Donilon) (6) ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’ 
12-Apr-13 W. House (7) ‘Fact Sheet: The Fiscal Year 2014 Federal Budget  
  
 
and the Asia-Pacific’ 
15-Apr-13 State (John Kerry) (8) ‘Remarks on a 21st Century Pacific Partnership’ 
21-Nov-13 W. House (Susan Rice) (9) ‘Remarks As Prepared for Delivery by 
  
 
National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice’ 
16-Dec-13 State (B. of Public Affairs) (10) ‘The East Asia-Pacific Rebalance:  
  
 
Expanding U.S. Engagement’ 
18-Dec-13 State (Scot Marciel) (11) ‘Economic Aspects of the Asia Rebalance’ 
04-Nov-14 State (John Kerry) (12) ‘Remarks on U.S.-China Relations’ 
15-Nov-14 W. House (Barack Obama) (13) ‘Remarks by President Obama at the  
  
 
University of Queensland’ 
30-Sept-14 Defense (Robert O. Work) (14) ‘Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work  
  
 
on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance’ 
06-Apr-15 Defense (Ash Carter) (15) ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S.  




Table 2: Subjects and their predicates in US government statements on the rebalance, 2011-2015  
United States Frequency Statement no. (Refer to Table 1) 
Presence in Asia Pacific essential 4 (1)(2)(5)(6) 
Promoter of Asia Pacific prosperity 13 (1)(2)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(14)(15) 
Promotor of Asia Pacific peace/security 15 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15) 
Pacific Power/nation 9 (1)(2)(3)(6)(7)(9)(10)(14)(15) 
Beneficial presence to Asia Pacific 4 (1)(2)(3)(8) 
Internationalism beneficial/essential 5 (1)(8)(12)(14)(15) 
Delegator of responsibilities 5 (2)(8)(9)(14)(15) 
Wanted/welcomed in Asia Pacific 6 (1)(2)(5)(6)(7)(14) 
Competence/leadership qualities 12 (1)(2)(3)(4)(7)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15) 
Promoter of fairness/rules for all 12 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(11)(14)(15) 
Promoter of human security/rights/advancement   11 (1)(2)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(14) 
Values/principles advanced for greater good 11 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(14)(15) 
Military beneficial/benevolent 10 (1)(2)(3)(5)(6)(9)(10)(13)(14)(15) 
Regional/global leader 6 (2)(3)(6)(12)(14)(15) 




Beneficiary of US-led governance/rules 4 (1)(3)(4)(15) 
Challenge/presents challenges 6 (1)(3)(6)(9)(14) 
Must play by international rules 6 (1)(5)(8)(9)(14)(15) 
Must advance/learn 5 (1)(6)(9)(12)(15) 
Prosperity benefits world  4 (2)(5)(8)(14) 
Need for guidance/discipline on human rights 6 (1)(2)(9)(11)(12)(14) 
Need for guidance/discipline on Cyber 
warfare/hacking 
5 (6)(9)(12)(14)(15) 
US-China relationship     
Different to US 6 (1)(7)(8)(9)(12)(14) 
Peaceful/prosperous rise welcome 4 (2)(3)(6)(14) 
US committed to work with China 9 (1)(2)(3)(6)(7)(8)(9)(12)(14) 
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US-China relationship mutually beneficial 6 (1)(6)(7)(8)(12)(14) 
Need for US and China to live up to 
responsibilities 
4 (2)(3)(6)(12) 




Democratic 5 (1)(5)(6)(8)(14) 
Contributor to peace/security 5 (1)(4)(5)(8)(9) 




Has potential/maturing 8 (1)(2)(6)(7)(8)(9)(12)(15) 
Opportunity for US 12 (1)(2)(3)(5)(6)(7)(9)(10)(11)(12)(14)(15) 
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